Month: October 2016

What should investors expect if Trump wins?

What should investors expect if Trump wins?

First, we think a Trump victory is quite unlikely. That said, the probability is not zero, it’s likely to be around 15-25%. We routinely analyze even less likely events and their impact on markets, so we have considered the reaction of markets if Mr. Trump were to win the general election.

There will be almost no place to hide from the initial volatility after an unexpected Trump victory. We expect significant turmoil in the financial markets and we believe that in the short-term (days/weeks) there will be few safe havens. Mr. Trump’s economic policies are so unconventional, and his temperament so mercurial, that we expect almost all sectors and asset classes to be somewhat affected by negative uncertainty. Precious metals may be the only asset that benefits from a flight to safety.

Bonds have traditionally served as a safe haven in times of turmoil. We believe bond investors should not remain sanguine if Mr. Trump does win the presidency. As a leveraged developer, Mr. Trump has had a colorful and combative history with lenders. His natural bluster has been intermittently aimed at bond markets during this campaign and the prospect of a Trump administration in control of the US Treasury is bound to spook bond investors. He has suggested he would unilaterally default on US sovereign debt (arguably not a novel position since the Republican congress toyed with a similar position in 2011) and seek to renegotiate principal amounts.

Mr. Trump has made combative comments about the Federal Reserve and its current policies. He has also expressed dissatisfaction with the current low interest rate regime. Taken together, these sharp, unusual policy views create immense uncertainty about how Mr. Trump would manage the credit and repayment of US debt, the government’s relationship with the Fed, and other issues of concern to the broader credit markets. We expect FX markets to exhibit a flight to perceived safety which historically has benefited the Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen. Uncertainty about bonds and rates will also hit real assets heavily dependent on credit markets. We do not expect real-estate to do well.

When it comes to stocks, we expect broad declines in the short term, but some sectors will be harder hit than others. The banking and financial sector is likely to see a steep decline in market sentiment and levels. Mr. Trump has made several negative statements about banks and their business models. Banks are also naturally leveraged and very sensitive to market sentiment. None of this augurs well for the banking or financial sectors.

Given Mr. Trump’s combative stance on trade and trade agreements, we would expect sectors dependent on imports/exports in their global supply chain to be battered. This includes consumer discretionary, technology, heavy industry, materials, and depending on precise global footprint, energy companies. In contrast, consumer staples should play their standard defensive role.

The immediate sentiment towards the defense industry is somewhat more uncertain. Mr. Trump has, at times, advocated a combative posture on national security and war matters. In almost direct contradiction, he has also proclaimed he would reduce the defense budget and the number of military bases overseas in line with his “America First” pledge. Defense contractors dependent on Pentagon contracts for services to troops overseas are likely to see sentiment and stock prices decline. Large defense manufacturers should decline as well since Mr. Trump has expressed skepticism about some expensive weapons programs (the F-35 in particular). The foreign policy and defense team Mr. Trump puts in place will determine how this plays out in the longer-term.

Beyond the initial few weeks and months, we expect much will depend on the composition of Mr. Trump’s administration and his demeanor during the transition. A prospective Trump administration caught up in balancing spending, debt, legislative priorities and political considerations would normally be constrained. However, Mr. Trump is likely to have a compliant Congress, with Republican legislative majorities and both Senators and Representatives eager to please the new force in American politics. It is impossible to make longer-range forecasts of what a Trump administration’s policies would look like, simply because we do not know his true priorities. We would advise investors to be extremely cautious about bargain-shopping in the immediate aftermath of a Trump victory.

Mr. Trump is unlikely to win the election, but in the event he did, we believe markets will react very poorly, at least initially. He is in many ways, the opposite of a traditional conservative politician, disdaining societal norms and conventional politics. Mr. Trump’s election would engender policy uncertainty on a scale not seen for decades, upending long-range business plans and reducing risk-appetites across the board. We would advise investors to exercise caution in the event Mr. Trump wins.

If a presidential candidate berates the Fed and no one pays attention, do markets still react?

If a presidential candidate berates the Fed and no one pays attention, do markets still react?

Friends,

The Federal Reserve chose not to raise rates in September, despite speculation by many participants that they would. The decision went as we expected since the Fed is generally unwilling to move rates this close to a presidential election. As an institution, the Fed is very reluctant to take actions that could be interpreted as favoring one or another party. Absent a genuine crisis (as in 2008), Fed governors will heavily favor inaction in a presidential election year. Inaction in this instance means an expansionary monetary policy with very low rates, and this does indeed benefit the incumbent party. In our view, this is more accidental than deliberate.

For a number of decades, central bankers have walked a fine line. They are political appointees, but their decisions are supposed to be apolitical, and they enjoy a degree of independence not afforded to the heads of other government agencies. Like all senior government officials, Fed governors are politically attuned and they undoubtedly have personal political preferences. In a normal election year, with a more typical slate of candidates, Fed inaction might lead to quiet grumblings within DC circles. But this is not a normal election year.

We have seen Mr. Trump repeatedly attack the Federal Reserve chair, Janet Yellen, in very personal terms for keeping rates low. This has received very little attention among all the other political news and outrageous statements by Mr. Trump in this cycle. As with so many things this year, we cannot say whether or not berating Fed officials will become the political norm.

What we do know is that in most countries, the slightest hint of overt political “interference” in central banking decisions can spook markets. The enormous volatility of the South African Rand over the past year is a case in point. European markets saw similar gyrations during the months leading up to Mario Draghi’s succession of Jean-Claude Trichet.

Though berating the Fed is a small part of Mr. Trump’s political plank, we had to go back to Williams Jennings Bryant’s candidacies of 1896 or 1900 to find an instance where central bankers and monetary policy was dragged into an American political contest in such a way. And that was back when US dollars were backed by gold in a fixed amount. Neither the Nixon administration’s abrogation of the gold standard nor Mr. Volcker’s unremitting steps to control inflation elicited such personal invective. As long as Mr. Trump’s chances of winning the presidency remain slim, the market will remain sanguine. If the prospect of a Trump presidency were to become more likely, we expect the future monetary policy of the US to become an area of immense concern for the markets.

We have discussed interest rates extensively in our previous letters, and would like to briefly turn our attention to debt levels. Extremely high levels of debt were the primary cause of the 2006-2009 financial crisis and generally make for a riskier financial system. Though US households and enterprises continue to reduce debt (deleverage), global debt levels have continued to rise. Looking at World Bank and IMF data, we can see that global private sector credit now exceeds 2008 levels (measured as a percentage of GDP). US private sector debt, at almost two times GDP, remains higher than the global average. Much of the growth in global debt levels has come from China where debt to GDP levels have risen significantly. In 2008, the World Bank pegged Chinese domestic credit at 100% of GDP. By 2015, this had risen to 150%.

Chinese debt has not yet reached extreme levels, but the rate of growth is more extreme than it was in the US between 1994 (when debt was 120% of GDP) and 2008 (when it reached a peak of 206%). Economies linked to China in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia in particular) have seen increases of similar magnitude. Latin America and the Middle East round out the regions where debt loads have increased, but levels remain relatively low, around 60-70% of GDP. China remains the biggest risk, since it has a relatively immature credit market which has seen enormous growth in the past decade.

In the US, equities markets have remained in a tight range for the past three years as consumers chose to reduce debt and forgo spending. The S&P 500 has continued trading between 1800 and 2200 since 2014. This can also be partly attributed to the tail end of the business cycle, with no immediate catalyst for either further growth or a retraction. At this stage, we would expect inflationary concerns to force interest rate hikes, but inflation is low to non-existent as consumers continue to reduce leverage and remain price-conscious. For the Fed, this remains a challenging period, with few answers available in textbooks. That said, we expect the Fed will raise interest rates in December, after the election is safely settled, likely by 0.25%.

Investors face similar uncertainties and we continue to advocate for cautious asset allocation and a focus on defensive companies and sectors.